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Abstract
This paper explains the multiple adoption of agriculture around ten thousand
years ago, in spite of the fact that the rst farmers su¤ered worse health and nu-
trition than their hunter gatherer predecessors. If output is harder for farmers to
defend, adoption may entail increased defense investments, and equilibrium con-
sumption levels may decline as agricultural productivity increases over a signicant
range, before eventually increasing thereafter. Agricultural adoption may have been
a prisonersdilemma in that adoption was individually attractive even though all
groups would have been better o¤ committing not to adopt while the initial pro-
ductivity advantage of agriculture remained low.
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1 Introduction
One of the great puzzles of prehistory is why agriculture caught on so fast when archaeo-
logical evidence suggests those who adopted it had worse health and nutrition than their
hunter gatherer predecessors and contemporaries.
Agriculture seems to have been independently adopted at least seven times: in Ana-
tolia, Mexico, the Andes of South America, northern China, southern China, the Eastern
United States, and in sub-Saharan Africa at least once and possibly up to four times. It
spread from the sites of its original adoption at a speed which seems slow to the modern
traveller but is remarkable by the standards of earlier innovations in prehistory - around
one kilometer per year westward across the European continent, for example. You might
think that, once the idea appeared and the climate made it possible, the answer was
obvious: why sweat going out to hunt and gather when you can sit and watch the grass
grow? An overwhelming productivity advantage of the new technology would seem quite
enough to explain its evident appeal to our ancestors. And yet this suggestion is inconsis-
tent, at least on the face of it, with some puzzling evidence from the skeletons of the rst
farmers (Weisdorf, 2005, and Bowles, 2009, provide valuable overviews). Studies of the
bones and teeth of some of the earliest agricultural communities of the Near East show
that farmers had worse health (due to poorer nutrition) than the hunter-gatherers who
preceded them. Increases in agricultural productivity in later millennia more thanmade
up for this eventually, but even so, the puzzle remains: what prompted agriculture to be
adopted so quickly and often within a comparatively short space of time, if it did not
achieve the one thing that a new agricultural technology surely ought to achieve - to leave
people better fed than they were before?
As we discuss below, some signicant di¢ culties arise in interpreting this evidence,
but there is a strong prima facie case that agricultural adoption actually caused living
standards to fall. There has been a large literature attempting to explain this paradox,
which we review in section 2. This literature has principally focussed on reasons why a new
technology that initially raised living standards might subsequently have had unintended
and unforeseen negative consequences: reduced vitamin intake due to less variety in the
diet, for instance, or increased disease due to crowding in settlements, or a variety of
broadly Malthusian explanations in which any initial productivity advantage was o¤set
by subsequent population growth. Each of these explanations makes the decision to adopt
agriculture one that had negative consequences, at least for a time, for the hunter gatherer
groups that made those adoption decisions. Had these consequences been foreseen, the
adoption decision might not have seemed so attractive. In this paper we want instead
to suggest to describe a process under which adoption of agriculture might have been a
rational decision for the adopting groups but have had adverse consequences for society
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as a whole. We set out a formal model with two groups in which each group can be
better o¤ adopting agriculture than if it had not done so, given the decision of the other
group, but both groups can be worse o¤ after the adoption than they were before. We
show therefore that there is no mystery in the idea that a technology which is attractive
to each group might make all groups worse o¤; we also show that the model is consistent
with some known features of the early Neolithic era.
Our model is based on the idea that agricultural communities needed to devote sub-
stantially more resources to defense than their hunter gatherer predecessors. Sitting and
watching the grass grow is not the idyll it seems, for those who are sedentary are also
vulnerable. When enemies attack, farmers have much more to lose than hunter-gatherers,
who can melt into the forest without losing earthworks, houses, chattels and stores of
food. So farmers not only face high risks, but they also need to spend time, energy and
resources defending themselves, building walls, manning watchtowers, guarding herds, pa-
trolling elds. This means less time and energy, fewer resources, devoted to making food.
It could even happen that the greater productivity of the hours they spend growing and
raising food is outweighed by the greater time they must spend defending themselves and
the food they have grown - meaning that they produce less food in all. Almost certainly
the end of the last ice age substantially improved the productivity of agriculture com-
pared with the hostile conditions beforehand. But what would that have mattered if all,
or more than all, of the additional benets of the new farming technology ended up being
spent on defense? Such additional defense expenditures could be highly costly even if, in
equilibrium, ghting was no more frequent than it had been before the change.
On its own this story cannot resolve the paradox with which we began, since it explains
the poor nutrition of the rst farmers only at the price of making it mysterious why they
should have adopted agriculture at all, let alone why this new technology should have
spread with such rapidity. Stunted farmers would hardly have been good advertisements
to their hunter gatherer neighbors of the qualities of their new wonder diet. What makes
the di¤erence, we suggest, is a crucial externality in the technology of defense. Once the
very rst farming communities began systematically to defend themselves, the fact that
they could do so began to make them a threat to their neighbors, including communities
who were on the margins of adopting agriculture themselves. For there is no such thing as
a purely defensive technology. Even walls around a town can make it easier for attacking
parties to travel out to raid nearby communities in the knowledge they have a secure
retreat. The club that prehistoric man used to ward o¤ attackers was the same club he
used to attack others. Once a community has invested in even a modest army, whether of
mercenaries or of its own citizens, the temptation to encourage that army to earn its keep
by preying on weaker neighbors can become overwhelming. So, even if the rst farming
communities were not necessarily any better o¤ than they would have been if no-one had
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adopted agriculture, once the process had started many communities had an interest in
joining in. These interactions could lead each to act ineluctably against the collective
interests of all.
In this paper we develop a formal model to show that it is entirely consistent with
rational behavior for the discovery and adoption of a more productive technology to
result in lower consumption. In fact we show that over a certain range of technological
improvement, and a fairly wide range of parameter values, the more productive is the new
technology the lower is consumption. In this case, consumption as a function of advances
in technology follows a U-shape. A technological improvement in agriculture induces
increased expenditure on defense whose impact on consumption initially outweighs the
benets of more advanced technology, before eventually the benets of new technology
become so important that consumption recovers. We perform a range of simulations that
suggest that such a mechanism could have had e¤ects important enough to be consistent
with the prehistoric evidence. We also tackle the question of why communities would
have adopted the technology in the rst place. It might seem that communities might
have been better o¤ committing themselves not to adopt the "superior" technology, but
we show that such a commitment would be di¢ cult to enforce, because even when the
net impact of the new technology is to lower living standards, each community may be
better o¤ adopting it independently of what its neighbors do.
Our model may therefore contribute to explaining an important transition in eco-
nomic history that, quite plausibly, set economic growth in motion for the very rst time.
Agriculture and the associated social changes, notably the adoption of a sedentary way
of life, made it possible for societies to accumulate economic resources in a way that
hunter-gatherer societies were quite unable to do. If agriculture had been a technology
that unambiguously improved the lot of humanity it would hardly be surprising that it
had been adopted as soon as it became feasible. That is why the evidence about early
Neolithic living standards has been such a puzzle - and perhaps adds substance to the
eternal appeal that myths of the noble savage have had throughout human history, since
such myths have seemed to suggest, counter-intuitively, that economic development since
the time of the alleged fall has been both inevitable and regrettable.
In addition, the argument we set out here has implications for a broader set of ques-
tions that have preoccupied economists and economic historians. The rst is the important
role played in the determination of living standards by changes in the extent to which
the output of production can be protected from theft. It is nowadays commonplace to
acknowledge the importance of transactions costs in economic growth and development.
North and Thomass (1973) place at the heart of economic history the notion of trans-
actions costs, and the idea that institutions evolve to economize on transactions costs
and in turn have an impact on economic outcomes. Acemoglu et.al. (2001) use similar
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arguments in their more systematic cross-country econometric investigation. Central to
the transactions cost literature is the idea that economic endowments and technologies
are not by themselves enough to yield economic growth. Individual agents still have to
undertake transactions for the possibilities a¤orded by endowments and technology to
be fully realized. However, agents may be inhibited from doing so by the cost of these
transactions. Our argument carries a similar message. Even output that can be produced
without the need for transactions as such must still be protected against theft before it
can contribute to human welfare. Put like that the point may seem obvious - what is less
obvious is that variations in the extent to which output can be protected may have played
an important part in the dynamics of growth during prehistory as well as in historical
times. Furthermore, increases in the vunerability of certain kinds of output to theft may
not only have led to an increase in the incidence of theft, but more importantly to a
diversion of societyís resources away from production and towards both aggressive and
defensive investments, with a consequent impact on productive investment and growth.
Our argument thus demonstrates a reason why productivity and consumption do not
necessarily move together, even when productivity growth is driven by a rational choice of
technology. We have known since Malthus that productivity and consumption per capita
may not move together, because population growth may outweigh changes in productivity,
thereby bringing consumption per capita homeostatically back towards a certain long-run
level. Our model demonstrates a simple and plausible mechanism, completely independent
of population growth, whereby changes in productivity may induce behavioral changes
that have a negative impact on living standards, which over a certain range is large enough
to outweigh the potential benet of technical progress.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes briey what we know about
agricultural adoption, and reviews some explanations for the fact that it occurred in
the way it did. Section 3 sets out our formal model of agricultural adoption by two
communities. Its purpose is to show carefully that agricultural adoption can both improve
the nutrition of any one community (relative to non-adoption and taking as given the
behaviour of the other), while also worsening the nutrition of both communities relative
to the status quo ante. Section 4 concludes.
2 Agricultural Adoption and Its Context
Evidence about the existence of at least seven and possibly as many as ten independent
adoptions of agriculture is summarized in Richerson, Boyd and Bettinger (2001). Evi-
dence for independent adoption has been found in Anatolia, Mexico, the Andes of South
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America, northern China, southern China, the Eastern United States, and in sub-Saharan
Africa at least once and possibly up to four times. The subsequent rapid spread of agri-
culture around the world is documented in Bellwood (1996) and Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi
and Piazza (1994). As Diamond (1995, especially chapter 6) emphasizes, it was not a
discrete choice: most communities continued to combine hunting and farming to varying
degrees for a very long time. Barker (2006) provides an encyclopaedic overview of what
is known about this process.
In this section we review evidence relating to three questions. First, what is the
evidence that farmers were worse o¤ on average after adoption than before? Secondly,
why might have adoption of agricultural at the margin have become attractive around
this time when it had evidently not been su¢ ciently attractive before? Thirdly, what is
the evidence that agriculture led to increased investment in defensive technology, as it
must have done for the process specied in our model to have been at work?
There is substantial evidence of agricultural communities whose skeletons show marks
of poorer nutrition than forager communities in similar areas at similar or slightly earlier
dates The studies presented in Cohen & Armelagos (1984) provided the rst main evi-
dence for this; substantially updated evidence is presented in Cohen and Crane-Kramer
(2007). Steckel and Rose (2002) have provided the most comprehensive attempt to stan-
dardize methodologies for comparing evidence across sites and regions. Other summaries
of the evidence are presented in Weisdorf (2005) and Bowles (2009). The extent of this
evidence for the existence of poorer nutrition among hunter gatherer than among roughly
contemporaneous forager communities is not in serious dispute, but questions of causality
are controversial. Two kinds of problem arise in concluding that agricultural adoption
made foragers worse o¤.
First, nutrition is not a perfect indicator of well-being: agricultural adopters might
consciously have traded other benets, such as physical security, for somewhat worse
nutrition; while there is limited positive evidence in favor of this argument it is almost
impossible to rule out. More subtly, many cereals are substantial sources of energy while
being decient in some important nutrients, as a number of studies in Cohen and Arme-
lagos (1984) and Cohen and Crane-Kramer (2007) discuss. Such a shift in the balance
of nutrition towards calories and away from proteins and vitamins might have been at-
tractive to the individuals but have led to their skeletons displaying greater evidence of
malnutrition.
Secondly, we cannot know that in comparing farmers to foragers we are holding other
factors constant. There are some reasons to think that the nutritional environment was
deteriorating for hunter gatherers due to over-hunting, a hypothesis advanced by Win-
terhalder & Lu (1995) and strongly corroborated by data in Stutz, Munro and Bar-Oz
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(2009). It is also plausible that even if initial farming adoption improved nutrition this
might have been o¤set by subsequent population growth, as argued by Bar-Yosef and
Belfer-Cohen (1989), Weisdorf (2008), Guzman and Weisdorf (2008) and Robson (2010).
In particular, the mechanism proposed by Robson is that a shift from hunter-gathering
to agriculture increased total factor productivity and led to a larger equilibrium popu-
lation, causing the overall land-labour ratio to fall. Using evolutionary psychology, he
suggests that farmers responded to land scarcity by having more children but investing
less per child. Lower investment in somatic capital explains why farmers were less robust
than hunter-gatherers.This, plus the associated population growth, might not only have
lowered per capita nutrition but also caused disease due to over-crowding.
Given dating uncertainty, we obviously cannot be sure whether the poor nutrition of
farmers documented by archaeologists represents the immediate aftermath of agricultural
adoption or the impact after a period of induced population growth. However, there are
enough independent sites showing poorer nutrition of farmers (beginning with those re-
ported by Cohen & Armelagos, 1984) for the hypothesis that that agricultural technology
made them worse o¤ to be worth taking very seriously.
What reason might we have nevertheless to think that agricultural technology became
su¢ ciently attractive to be adopted at the margin although it had not been so before?
First, the global warming associated with the end of the Upper Paleolithic opened tech-
nological possibilities that had not existed before, even in previous interglacial periods
(see Richerson, Boyd and Bettinger, 2001; Dow, Olewiler & Reed, 2006). Barker (2006)
shows that many communities had adopted over time practices that made agriculture
more attractive - a point also made by Tudge (1998). These practices made it possible to
sedentarize gradually - by returning regularly to previous foraging grounds, for example,
and tending to the plants and trees there. Of course, it is important not to exaggerate the
obstacles to adoption in previous interglacial periods. As Mithen (1996) points out, earlier
humans had sophisticated biological knowledge of both animals and plants, so that it does
not seem likely that the problem lay in lack of the kinds of skill that agriculture would
have required. Also, as Ofek (2006) argues, earlier hominid evolution had seen a number
of powerful social and economic innovations including the hunter-gatherer lifestyle itself.
One hypothesis (due to Cohen, 1977) suggests that there was a late Pleistocene food crisis
caused by population pressure which more or less forced agricultural adoption as a way
out. This is problematic, however, because of evidence that hunter-gatherers were able
to control population growth through various measures including infanticide. The overall
conclusion to be drawn from the evidence in Barker (2006) is therefore probably that
the combination of earlier innovations and the magnitude of the global warming pushed
agriculture over the threshold of productivity to make it attractive enough to adopt at
the margin.
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What is the evidence that agricultural adoption led to an increase in investments in
defensive technology? Note that this is not the same as the claim that they led to an
increase in the incidence of warfare, for which there is some evidence (Gat 1999; Baker,
Bulte and Weisdorf, 2010). Increased warfare is compatible with but in no way implied
by our model. Investments in defensive technology would have included the time spent in
guarding herds and patrolling lands and settlements, an investment that leaves few archae-
ological traces. But the most lasting traces are those left by weaponry and fortications
(Gat 2006, pp.167-173). It is possible that some investments in weaponry might be due
to costly sexual signaling independent of any need to the community (Seabright, 2010, p.
62); the greater elaborateness of weaponry found among agricultural communities might
be a sign of greater prosperity rather than greater need. But the evidence from fortica-
tions is harder to argue away men dont build walls and dig ditches to impress women
unless walls and ditches are what their women really want. The rst village settlement at
Jericho, for instance, has been dated to before 9000 b.c.e., and within a thousand years it
had grown to a substantial settlement of severalhectares of mud-brick houses with thick
walls. The rst evidence of the famous city walls comes from the early eighth century
b.c., and the presence of great water tanks, probably for irrigation, is attested from the
seventh century. And a massive ditch, thirty feet deep and ten feet wide, was dug into
the rock without metal tools. A similarly massive ditch, all the more impressive because
of the small size of the community that built it, is recorded at Banpo neolithic village in
central China (Seabright, 2010, p. 55).
While none of these three strands of evidence is free of di¢ culty, we feel condent
in concluding that there is strong prima facie evidence that the adoption of agriculture
was a) productive enough for adoption at the margin to become attractive to forager
communities in the Holocene era, b) insu¢ ciently productive to raise living standards
on average where a large proportion of communities adopted it, and c) accompanied by
substantial increases on investments in defensive technology, particularly in fortications.
The purpose of our model is to show how a) and b) are compatible, and the answer lies
in the presence of c). The later dynamic consequences of agricultural adoption (notably
those of increased population growth) are entirely compatible with the model but are not
treated within it.
Theories that appeal to the adverse consequences of population growth following a
productivity improvement are inevitably reminiscent of the arguments of Thomas Malthus
(1798, II.25)1. However, with the exception of Robson (2010) cited above, Malthusian
theory would predict that an initial increase in living standards above subsistence level
would be followed by a subsequent reversion to the subsistence level as population growth
caught up with the increased productivity of the xed factor land. It does not explain the
evidence we have cited here, which is of an initial reduction in per capita consumption
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which lasted for a signicant time before it was eventually reversed. This is the purpose
of our model.
The model is related to two strands of economic literature. The rst, which models
in various ways the choice of economic agents to devote resources to protecting their
property and (often simultaneously) encroaching on the property of others, is surveyed
in Dixit (2004); an interesting contribution is Grossman (1998). Gonzalez (2005) and
Gonzalez &Neary (2008) develop the idea that an increase in the resources used for conict
may be induced by an increase in productivity, in an endogenous growth framework in
which productive capital and conáict capital are complements. Unlike us, they focus
on technological backwardness induced by anticipation of future conict rather than on
the possible welfare-reducing consequences of the adoption of more advanced technology.
The second consists of models embodying contest functions (Becker 1983, Dixit 1987,
Hirshleifer 1989, Nitzan 1994, Aidt 2002, Hwang, 2009), where the investments of one
agent in some process that changes changes resource allocations in that agentís favour
(lobbying, for instance) can be o¤set by the investments of a rival agent. Finally, a long-
standing literature in political theory, going back to Ibn Khaldun (1377) and Ferguson
(1774), and excellently discussed by Ernest Gellner (1994), considers the need to raise a
surplus for defense as constituting the foundation of the division of labor in modern society,
and as giving rise to some of the most intractable problems of political organization.
3 A Simple Model: Production and Theft
There are two groups, i = 1; 2 of equal size, each endowed with one unit of labor1. Each
group allocates labor lHi to hunting, l
F
i to farming and l
W
i to warfare, with l
H
i +l
F
i +l
W
i = 1.
Both hunting and farming are forms of production, while warfare is an activity devoted
to the theft of resources from others and defense against such theft. We begin with
production. We assume that the outputs of hunting and farming are measured in such
a way that single units of each are nutritionally equivalent. Labor is used to produce
ouput in either hunting or farming, subject to the following strictly concave production
technologies.
1Band size is therefore exogenous, unlike in Marceau & Myers (2006). Marceau & Myers explain
post-adoption food crises by splintering of previously cooperative groups. Such mechanisms are of course
compatible with the one discussed here - however, predicting when cooperation will occur and when it
will break down is notoriously di¢ cult, and the present model requires no such mechanism for food crises
to occur.
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Hunting: Hi = H
 
lHi

=
 
lHi
1 
1   for 0 <  < 1 (1)
Farming: Fi = F
 
lFi

=
 
lFi
1 
fi
1  
The above specication captures a range of concavity assumptions ranging from near
linearity to highly inelastic production. If fi < 1 then farming is less productive than
hunting for the same level of labor input.
The marginal product of labor is given by
H 0
 
lHi

=
 
lHi
 
and F 0
 
lFi

=
 
lFi
 
fi (2)
These functions satisfy the Inada conditions
H 0(0); F 0(0) =1: (3)
Aggregate output is maximised when no labor is devoted to warfare and all labor is
e¢ ciently allocated between hunting and farming. In this case, output is given by
Y potentiali =

1 + f
1

i

1  
This is an increasing function of fi. Thus, whatever the value of fi, mixed hunting and
farming always yields a higher potential output than either hunting or farming alone.
This is due to diminishing returns in each type of production. If fi is small it would be
grossly ine¢ cient to specialise in farming, but there is some gain to be had from farming
on a small scale as a supplement to hunting.
Next we consider warfare. The allocation of labor to warfare is valuable for each
group because it enables this group to appropriate the food of its rival, and to resist
similar attempts by the other group. In the model warfare results purely in theft, never
in the destruction of resources; this simplication seems reasonable since if we were to take
resource-destruction into account, it would be even easier to demonstrate the possibility
of Pareto-inferior adoption equilbria.
Let ij denote the proportion of group is hunting output, and ij the proportion of
its farming output, that is transferred to group j. In equilibrium there will typically be
transfers in both directions: each group will steal to some extent from the other. The
10
total income of a group is equal to the hunting and farming output that it succeeds in
keeping safe from theft, plus the hunting and farming output that it steals from the rival
group:
Ci = (1  ij)H(lHi ) + (1  ij)F (lFi ) + jiH(lHj ) + jiF (lFj ) (4)
It will be convenient to write this in the alternative form:
Ci = (1  ij)H

1  lWi
1 + ri

+ (1  ij)F
 
ri
 
1  lWi

1 + ri
!
(5)
+jiH
 
1  lWj
1 + rj
!
) + jiF
 
rj
 
1  lWj

1 + rj
!
where ri = lFi =l
H
i is the ratio of farming labor to hunting labor and 1  lWi is is the total
amount of labor devoted to these activities.
The proportions of output that are transferred depend on the amounts of labor devoted
to warfare by the two groups and are given by the following logistic functions:
ij =
2
1 + e l
and ji =
2
1 + el
ij =
2
1 + e l
and ji =
2
1 + el
(6)
where ;  > 0 and l = lWj   lWi . We shall assume that 2 < 1 + e  and 2 < 1 + e .
Since l 2 [ 1; 1] this ensures that ij; ji; ij; ji < 1 and hence each group retains a
non-zero fraction of its own hunting and farming outputs. Note that the argument of
both transfer functions is the absolute di¤erence in military strength of the two groups,
not the ratio of their strengths. Using the ratio of their strengths would not e¤ect the
main results of this paper.2.
When the two groups are evenly matched l = lWj   lWi = 0 and
@ij
@l
=


@ij
@l
@ji
@l
=


@ji
@l
2The equivalent ratio formulae would be as follows:
2
1 +
 
lWj =l
W
i

For an application of this alternative approach see Rowthorn et al (2009).
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Thus, the ratio


indicates the relative vulnerability of farming and hunting with respect
to changes in the balance of military power. If this ratio is large then an adverse shift in
the balance of power will have a much greater impact on farming income than on huntng
income.
We assume that each group chooses its own labor allocation so as to maximise con-
sumption taking as given the labor allocation of the other group. The resulting solution
will be a Nash equilibrium3. It is useful in the present context to distinguish between
two kinds of Nash equilibrium. A solution is a local Nash equilibrium if neither group
can increase its consumption through a marginal change in its own labor allocation. It
is a global Nash equilibrium if there is no feasible labor re-allocation, however large, that
will yield either group a higher level of consumption, taking the allocation of the other
group as given. The following are necessary, although not su¢ cient, conditions for a Nash
equilibrium of either kind:
@Ci
@ri
 0; ri  0 and ri@Ci
@ri
= 0 (7)
@Ci
@lWi
 0; lWi  0 and lWi
@Ci
@lWi
= 0 (8)
Given that ij; ij; < 1;the Inada conditions (3) together with (7) imply that optimal
values of lHi and l
F
i are non-zero and hence l
W
i < 1. Thus, some labour is always devoted
to both hunting and farming. Moreover,
(1  ij)H 0(lHi ) = (1  ij)F 0(lFi ) (9)
The intuitive meaning of equation (9) is simple. The total amount of labor that is
available for production should always be allocated so as to equalize the marginal products
in hunting and farming, net of any loss from theft.
3.1 Mixed Hunting and Farming: Symmetrical Solution when
fi = fj = f
Suppose that both groups use the same farming technologies so that fi = fj = f . At
a symmetrical equilibrium, the labor allocations in the two groups are identical. Thus,
lFi = l
F
j = l
F ; lHi = l
H
j = l
H ; lWi = l
W
j = l
W and ri = rj = r: The following proposition is
proved in Appendix 2.
3We consider only pure strategies in whih groups do not randomise their behaviour. Throughout this
paper the term "Nash equilibrium" is used to denote an equilibrium in which both groups use only pure
strategies.
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Proposition 1: Equations (7) and (8) have a unique symmetric solution, which is
given as follows
lF
lH
= r =

(1  )f
1  
1=
(10)
lW = min(0; 1  P=Q) (11)
where
P = (1  )(1 + r) > 0
Q =

1   +
r
1   > 0
The symmetric solution given by equations (10) and (11) is a local Nash equilibrium
if and only if it satises one of the following conditions:
(i) P > Q or
(ii) P  Q and
r2   2

(1  )2

(1  x)
8
  x

r + x2  0 (12)
where
x =


1 



1 

Proof. See Appendix 2.
Corollary 2 Provided  is su¢ ciently close to 1 condition (12) is satised for all values
of f:Thus, if there are strongly diminishing returns in production,the symmetric solution
is always a local Nash equilbrium.
Corollary 3 If 
1  6= 1  and  is su¢ ciently close to zero, there are values of f for
which condition (12) is not satised. Thus, if the production function is almost linear,
the symmetric solution may not be a local Nash equilbrium.
If condition (12) is satised then, taking the behavior of the other group as given,
neither group can improve its situation through a marginal change in its own behavior.
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This leaves open the possibility that a group might do better through a non-marginal
change in behavior. It also leaves open the question of asymmetric Nash equilibria in
which the two groups choose di¤erent strategies. We were not able to resolve these issues
by analytic means so we explored the properties of the model by simulation. Using
a wide variety of di¤erent combinations of f and the other parameters (8,000 in all)
we found that almost 90% of these combinations give rise to a symmetric global Nash
equilibrium. These are the only global Nash equilibria that we could nd. In all of the
numerical examples considered later in this paper, the symmetric solution satises the
conditions given in Proposition 1 and our simulations indicate that it is also a global
Nash equilibrium. Details of these simulations are given in Appendix 1.
3.2 When does farming reduce consumption?
With xed expenditure on warfare, consumption is always higher if some labor is devoted
to farming. However, this ignores the possibility that the introduction of farming may
lead to additional warfare expenditure on such a scale that the amount left over for
consumption actually falls. We shall now specify the parameter values for which this will
occur.
Consider a modied version of the above model in which all parameters are the same,
but each group is constrained to allocate zero labor to farming. In this case, lFi ; l
F
j = 0
and consumption is given by the following version of equation (4):
hunting only: Ci = (1  ij)H(lHi ) + jiH(lHj ) (13)
Each group chooses the allocation of labor between warfare and hunting that max-
imises its own consumption, taking the labour allocation of the other group as given
.
Proposition 4: There is at most one symmetric Nash equilibrium in the hunting only
version. If it exists it is given by the following equations:
hunting only: lW = min

0; 1  (1  )(1  )


(14)
Proof : The hunting only solution can be be derived by setting r = 0 in the equation
(11) for mixed hunting and farming.
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Proposition 5: At an internal symmetric equilibrium (where lW > 0) consumption
in the mixed hunting and farming economy is lower than in the hunting only economy if
and only if the following inequality is satised:
1 +

1  
1  
 1 

f
1
 <
 
1 +



1  
1  
 1 

f
1

!1 
Proof : See Appendix 2.
For su¢ ciently large values of f this inequality does not hold and consumption is
therefore higher in the mixed economy than in the hunting only economy. Note that for
small values of f the above inequality can be approximated as follows:
1
1   <


If this condition is not satised, there can be no value of f for which the introduction
of farming leads to a fall in consumption. Other things being equal, the larger is the ratio


the larger is the range of f over which the shift to agriculture reduces consumption.
3.3 The e¤ects of agricultural innovation
With xed expenditure on warfare, an agricultural innovation that increases farming pro-
ductivity will lead to higher consumption. However, the shift to more advanced farming
may involve so much extra warfare expenditure that the amount left over for consumption
falls. The following proposition species the parameter values for which this will be the
case.
Proposition 6: At an internal symmetric Nash equilibrium (where lW > 0), both
groups will be worse o¤ following a marginal increase in f if and only if the following
conditions are satised
1
1   <


f <

1     

 
1

 
1  
1  
1 
Proof : See Appendix 2.
Since 0 <  < 1 the rst condition requires that


> 1. This is possible only
if farming is more vulnerable than hunting to shifts in the balance of military power.
When both conditions are satised, consumption will decline as productivity increases
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because the resulting shift of labor out of production into warfare outweighs the greater
productivity of the labor that remains in production. Other things being equal, the larger
is the value of


the larger is the range of f for which the gains of higher agricultual
productivity are outweighed by the resulting diversion of labor into warfare.
3.4 Some Numerical Examples
As an illustration, we shall now consider some numerical examples. In each example, sim-
ulation indicates that the symmetric solution is internal and is a global Nash equilibrium.
Figure 1 here
Figure 1 plots consumption against agricultural productivity (f) for four di¤erent
combinations of the main parameters. Along each curve rising agricultural productivity
is accompanied by a gradual shift of labor from hunting into farming. At the same time
an increasing share of the labor force is devoted to warfare. Along curve C1, consumption
rises uniformly as the benets of technical progress always outweigh the costs of higher
warfare expenditure. Along the other curves there is a phase during which the additional
costs of warfare exceed the gains from technical progress, with the result that consumption
falls. Along curve C2 this phase is of short duration and the fall in consumption is modest.
Along curves C3 and C4, the fall in consumption is greater and lasts for longer. The values
of f for which consumption is at a minimum along C2, C3 and C4 are 1.08, 1.21, 1.36,
respectively. The corresponding values of lw are 22%, 33% and 55%. A gure of 55% for
the proportion of labor devoted to warfare is rather extreme, but the lower gures of 22%
and 33% are more realistic. They indicate that for certain parameter values our model
can generate a plausible explanation of how the extra warfare costs associated agriculture
may outweigh its technical advantages.
Figure 2 here
Figure 2 compares consumption under two kinds of social arrangement. In one case,
there is no agriculture at all and both communities engage exclusively in hunting. They
allocate their labor between hunting and warfare as analyzed above and their level of
consumption is determined by the Nash equilibrium given in equation (14). In the other
case, both communities engage in mixed hunting and farming and their consumption is
determined by the Nash equilibrium given in equations (10) and (11). Comparing the two
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curves there is a prolonged range over which the mixed hunting and farming communities
have lower consumption than the specialized hunters. They would have been better o¤
to have remained as pure hunters. Despite its potential benets, the development of
agriculture has made them poorer because it is associated with greater expenditure on
warfare. For the same reason, even in communities where agriculture is already partially
established, further technical progress in this sector may make them worse o¤. This phase
does not last forever and consumption eventually recovers as technical progress continues.
We should emphasize that what we call "warfare" costs are not the costs of resource
destruction, let alone loss of life, associated with warfare as it has been known historically
in all societies. If we were to take resource destruction into account the likelihood that
agriculture could lower consumption would be even higher than it is in our model. Our
model captures only the costs of preparing for war - the costs of policing settlements and
protecting their foodstocks. The fact that agricultural societies had to divert considerable
resources into such policing activities - over and above any destruction of resources that
resulted - could important part of the explanation for the drop in consumption that
followed the Neolithic revolution.
3.5 PrisonersDilemma: agricultural innovation is di¢ cult to
resist even if it lowers consumption for everyone.
Proposition 6 implies that both groups might be better o¤ committing themselves to
inhibit agricultural innovation, but says nothing about how di¢ cult or easy that commit-
ment might be. Here we show that it may be di¢ cult to make such a commitment, since
it may be in each groups individual interest to adopt new agricultural techniques even
though it is not in their collective interest.
Consider a system that is in symmetric equilibrium and suppose that a small improve-
ment in agricultural productivity from f to f+f becomes available. Suppose also that
i adopts the new technology and the other group j does not. The e¤ect on the consump-
tion of i will depend on what happens to labor allocation in j. If there is no alteration in
js labor allocation, then i will experience the following change in consumption
Ci =

@Ci
@fi
+
@Ci
@lWi
dlWi
fi
+
@Ci
@ri
dri
fi

f
Since the system was initially in equilibrium, the second and third terms in parentheses
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are zero and hence
Ci =
@Ci
@fi
f
=
(1  ij)
 
lFi
1 
1  f
> 0
Alternatively, j may adjust its labor allocation in response to what happens in i. In this
case, the above formula must be modied as follows
Ci =
@Ci
@fi
f +
"
@Ci
@lWj
dlWj
@fi
+
@Ci
@rj
drj
@fi
#
f (15)
We were unable to determine analytically the sign of the right hand expression, but
extensive simulations suggest that it is normally positive (see Appendix 1). An analogous
equation applies to group j if it chooses to follow the example of i and adopt the new
technology.
The above discussion implies that it will normally pay either group to adopt the new
technology unilaterally. It will also pay the other group to follow suit. However, under
the conditions specied in Proposition 6, both groups will be worse o¤ if they both adopt
the new technology. In this case, they will be trapped in a prisonersdilemma.
This is the situation on the downward sloping sections of the curves shown in Figure
1. The nature of the dilemma is illustrated in Table 1, which is based on equation (15).
The table shows the implications of a small change in technology, f; at the symmetric
equilibrium for f = 1:1 on curve C4.
Table 1: PrisonersDilemma Example
Column Player
Do Not Adopt Adopt
Row Do Not Adopt 0, 0  2:87f , 2:51f
Player Adopt 2:51f ,  2:87f  0:36f ,  0:36f
If one group adopts the new technology unilaterally it makes a gain for itself but
imposes an even larger loss on the other group. This loss is only partly recouped if the
other group also adopts the new technology. Similar matrices can be computed throughout
the downward sloping sections of curves C2, C3 and C4.
18
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that the adoption of a superior production technology can
make its adopters worse o¤ if it requires them to devote more resources to stealing and to
protecting their output from each others aggression. They may nevertheless nd adoption
di¢ cult to resist since it may be in each partys interest to adopt the new technology
whatever the other does - in other words, adoption may be a prisonersdilemma resulting
in the collective harm via the pursuit of individual advantage.
We have set out a model in which a potentially superior technology produces
output which is easier for others to steal, in a sense we have made analytically precise.
We have demonstrated that at most one symmetric pure strategy equilibrium of our model
exists and have given it a characterization. In simulations over a wide range of plausible
parameter estimates we have shown that a pure strategy equilibrium exists in a a large
majority of cases. In a substantial subset of these cases, consumption initially falls as the
productivity of the superior technology increases, although it eventually recovers when the
productivity advantage of the new technology becomes su¢ ciently great. Furthermore, in
all these cases consumption falls in equilibrium even though each group benets through
unilateral adoption given the behaviour of the other group. Under these conditions a
commitment by all groups to refrain from adopting the new technology would be di¢ cult
to achieve even though such an agreement would make them all better o¤.
Our model may contribute to explaining the puzzle that the spread of agriculture
in the Neolithic revolution was accompanied by an apparent decline in human nutrition. If
agriculture made people worse o¤why did it spread so dramatically throughout the world?
The answer, we have argued, has two elements. First, the rapid spread of agriculture is
explained by the fact that, after the end of the ice age, agriculture became productive
enough to be attractive to many individual groups, given the choices of other groups
with whom they came into contact. This improvement in productivity compared to the
alternative of hunting and gathering was due principally to climate change. However,
the evolution of human cognitive capacities as described by Steven Mithen may also have
played a part: the early neolithic phase of global warming was far from being the only
comparable one in human prehistory, but it may have been the only one to occur after
human beings were cognitively ready to take advantage of it.
The second element in our answer helps to explain the poor nutrition of the rst
farmers. Many mechanisms have been proposed to explain why agricultural adoption
might have had unforeseen and unintended consequences that lowered the nutrition of
adopters, many of them the e¤ects of population growth. We suggest that some conse-
quences of adoption might make all adopters collectively worse o¤ even if no adopter was
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individually worse o¤ than without the adoption. In particular, increased investments in
defense that were induced in equilibrium by the adoption of agriculture could impose a
negative externality on neighbors: each group had to invest more in defense both because
of its own decision to adopt and because of the adoption decisions of its neighbors.
Paradoxically, too, the higher the proportion of adopters among a groups neigh-
bors, the stronger the incentive for the group itself to adopt, even though this would also
require it to spend more on defense. Together with the population growth e¤ect described
by Bar-Josef and Belfer-Cohen and the depletion of game described by Winterhalder and
Lu, this would have created a ratchet e¤ect of adoption that goes a long way towards
explaining the speed with which the technology spread.
In conclusion, there is no need to appeal to unanticipated consequences to under-
stand why the higher productivity of agricultural labor over hunting and gathering did
not initially lead to an improvement in living standards for the adopters. Even anticipated
consequences could have had this result.To the extent that adoption could have been to
the advantage of each individual group while being to the collective disadvantage of all,
the paradox that agricultural adoption appears to have reduced living standards becomes
less di¢ cult to explain.
Although we have interpreted our model as being about the adoption of agricul-
ture, in principle it is applicable to any technology that induces increased expenditure
on security. Arms races in more modern periods of history undoubtedly owe something
to this logic. It may also have a lesson for more mundane improvements in technology
that are accompanied by increased opportunities for theft (such as the miniaturization
of electronic goods). It is worth emphasizing also that although we have interpreted the
players in our model as small groups initially devoted to hunting and gathering, they can
also be interpreted as individuals or as groups of any size including nation states.
At the heart of the story is a fundamental externality from defense activities that
make one community more secure make its neighbors less secure. That externality - crucial
as it was to the Neolithic revolution - has been of continued importance throughout human
history right up to our own day.
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5 Appendix 1: Simulations
This appendix describes the simulations that were used to identify the Nash equilibria of
the games presented in the text.
Programs. A strategy for group i can be specied by three variables, lHi ; l
F
i ; l
W
i ;
which denote the amount of labor devoted to hunting, farming and war, respectively.
The total amount of labor is xed such that lHi + l
F
i + l
W
i = 1: Suppose that group j
devotes a given amount of labor lWj to war. What is the best response of group i to this
behavior? To nd the answer one can search over a grid specifying the values of both lHi
and lFi . However. the following procedure is more economical. Consider an arbitrary
strategy under which group i devotes lWi to war. Given this decision and the fact that
j is devoting lWj to war, the highest payo¤ to i is achieved when l
F
i =l
H
i satises equation
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(??) of the text. Thus,
lFi =l
H
i = ri =
 
(1  ij)f
1  
ij
!1=
where ij =
2
1 + e l
ij =
2
1 + e l
l = lWj   lWi
The implied values of lHi and l
F
i are as follows,
lHi = (1  lWi )=(1 + ri)
lFi = ri(1  lWi )=(1 + ri):
For any given value of lWi these are the only values of l
H
i and l
F
i that could possibly
be a best response to the given strategy of j, and there is no point in examining other
strategies. In searching for a best response we therefore can restrict ourselves to a limited
set of strategies that is indexed by the variable lWi and satisfy the above equations. There
are many other strategies available to i but they cannot be optimal since their lFi =l
H
i ratio
is inappropriate. By ignoring these non-starters we greatly reduce the amount of memory
and computing time that is required for simulation.
On the basis of the above observations the following programmes were written in
Matlab R14. One programme checks to see whether a particular pair of candidate
strategies is a Nash equilibrium. This is done by comparing the payo¤s to i from various
strategies on the assumption that j plays the specied candidate strategy. The comparison
is based on 10; 001 distinct strategies for group i which are specied by values of lWi
distributed uniformly between 0 and 1. A second programme uses a 501  501 grid of
strategies indexed by lWi and l
W
j to search for Nash equilibria. This involves searching
through a matrix containing more than 250; 000 entries for each group. Both of these
programmes consider only strategies for which the ratios lFi =l
H
i and l
F
j =l
H
j are optimal for
the groups concerned. As a cross-check, searches were also done in which non-optimal
values of lFi =l
H
i and l
F
j =l
H
j were allowed. These searches conrmed the results of the
main programs. The main programmes were then modied to allow for groups who are
constrained to specialize in hunting only or farming only.
Results. The existence of Nash equilibria was investigated for 8; 000 di¤erent
parameter sets obtained by combining the following parameter values
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Parameter values
 0.05 0.2 0.35 0.5 ..
 0.5 1 2 4 6
 0.05 0.2 0.35 0.5 ..
 0.5 1 2 4 6
 0.05 0.2 0.35 0.5 ..
f 0.3 1 2 3 4
This investigation revealed that
 All Nash equilibria are symmetric.
 All Nash equilibria are unique.
 All Nash equilibria of the mixed hunting and farming model satisfy equations (10)
and (11) of the text.
 11% of parameter sets have no Nash equilibrium in the case where mixed hunting
and farming are allowed.
 5% of parameter sets have no Nash equilibrium in the case where the two groups
are constrained to specialize in the same activity (hunting or shing).
We also investigated the existence of equilibria for the examples shown in Charts 1 to
4. All of the parameter sets used for these diagrams have unique Nash equilibria that
satisfy equations (10) and (11) of the text.
Finally, the value of dCi
dfi
at a symmetric solution, as dened in Proposition 1, was
evaluated for every combination of the following parameters:
 = (0:15; 0:2; 0:3; 0:4; 0:5; 0:6; 0:7; 0:8; 0:9);
 = (0:5; 1; 1:5; 2; 2:5; 3; 3:5; 4);
 = (0:1; 0:2; 0:3; 0:4; 0:5; 0:6);
 = (0:5; 1; 1:5; 2; 2:5; 3; 3:5; 4);
 = (0:1; 0:2; 0:3; 0:4; 0:5; 0:6);
f = (0:1; 0:2; 0:3; 0:4; 0:5; 0:6; 0:7; 0:8; 0:9; 1:0; 1:1; 1:2;
1:3; 1:4; 1:5; 1:6; 1:7; 1:8; 1:9; 2:0; 2:5; 3:0; 3:5; 4:0):
There were 372,926 of these combinations for which P=Q  1: This condition indicates
that the symmetric solution is either interior or just on the boundary. For all such
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combinationsdCi
dfi
> 0: We also investigated what happens when  is small (< 0:15):In a
few cases the computed sign of dCi
dfi
was positive. This may reect rounding errors due to
the fact production functions are almost linear.
6 Appendix 2. Derivations and Proofs
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
6.1.1 First Order Conditions
Di¤erentiating (5) yields
@Ci
@ri
=  (1  ij)(1  l
W
i )
(1 + ri)
2 H
0
i +
(1  ij)(1  lWi )
(1 + ri)
2 F
0
i (16)
@Ci
@lWi
=
 (1  ij)H 0i
1 + ri
  ri(1  ij)F
0
i
1 + ri
(17)
 @ij
@lWi
Hi  
@ij
@lWi
Fi +
@ji
@lWi
Hj +
@ji
@lWi
Fj
At a symmetrical solution these equations imply that
@Ci
@ri
=  (1  )(1  l
W )
 
lH
 
(1 + r)2
+
(1  )(1  lW )f  lF  
(1 + r)2
(18)
@Ci
@lWi
=  
 
(1  )  lH  + (1  )rf  lF  
1 + r
!
+

 
lH
1 
+ f
 
lF
1 
1   (19)
To be a local or global Nash equilibrium, a symmetric solution must satisfy the com-
plementary slack conditions:
@Ci
@ri
 0; r  0 and r@Ci
@ri
= 0 (20)
@Ci
@lWi
 0; lW  0 and lW @Ci
@lWi
= 0 (21)
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We shall now show that there is at most one symmetric solution that satises these
conditions. Hence there can be at most one symmetric Nash equilibrium.
The Inada conditions H 0(0) = F 0(0) = 1 ensure that 1   lW ; lH ; lF ; r > 0:Hence
@Ci
@ri
= 0 and from (18) it follows that
lF
lH
= r =

f(1  )
1  
1=
After rearrangement and noting that lH + lF = 1  lW we can write (19) as follows
 
lH

(1 + r)
@Ci
@lWi
=  P + Q(1  lW )
where
P = (1  )(1 + r)
Q =

(1  ) +
r
(1  )
In a Nash equilibrium it must be the case that lH ; lF > 0. Hence r is nite and
P;Q > 0: Two cases arise.
Case 1: Q  P: In this case, @Ci=@lWi = 0 if and only if lW = 1   P=Q: This is the
only symmetric solution.
Case 2: Q < P:In this case, lW = 0 and @Ci=@lWi < 0.
In each case, the complementary slack conditions (20) and (21) are satised. Thus,
there is at most one symmetric solution. If it exists it is given by the following equations
lF
lH
= r =

f(1  )
1  
1=
lW = min(0; 1  P=Q)
6.1.2 Second Order Conditions
If P < Q the di¤erential @Ci=@lWi is strictly negative. This is su¢ cient for a local
maximum. If P = Q the di¤erential @Ci=@lWi is equal to zero. A su¢ cient condition for
a local maximum is that Ci is a strictly concave function of lwi and ri for i = 1; 2:
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Holding ri constant and di¤erentiating (17) with respect to lwi yields
@2Ci
@ (lWi )
2 =
(1  ij)H 00i
(1 + ri)
2 +
(1  ij)r2iF 00i
(1 + ri)
2 (22)
+2
@ij
@lWi
H 0i
1 + ri
+ 2
@ij
@lWi
riF
0
i
1 + ri
  @
2ij
@ (lWi )
2Hi  
@2ij
@ (lWi )
2Fi
+
@2ji
@ (lWi )
2Hj +
@2ji
@ (lWi )
2Fj
At a symmetric equilibrium
@ij
@lWi
=  
2
;
@ij
@lWi
=  
2
@2ij
@ (lWi )
2 =
@2ij
@ (lWi )
2 =
@2ji
@ (lWi )
2 =
@2ji
@ (lWi )
2
Hence
@2Ci
@ (lWi )
2 =
(1  )H 00
(1 + r)2
+
(1  )r2F 00
(1 + r)2
(23)
 H
0
1 + r
  rF
0
1 + r
Holding lwi constant and di¤erentiating (16) with respect to ri yields
2(1 + ri)
1  lWi
@Ci
@ri
+
(1 + ri)
2
1  lWi
@2Ci
@ (ri)
2 =
(1  ij)(1  lWi )H 00i
(1 + ri)
2 +
(1  ij)(1  lWi )F 00i
(1 + ri)
2 (24)
At a symmetric equilibrium @Ci
@ri
= 0 and hence
@2Ci
@ (ri)
2 =
(1  lW )2
(1 + r)4
[(1  )H 00 + (1  )F 00] (25)
Holding ri constant and di¤erentiating (16) with respect to lwi yields
(1 + ri)
2
(1  lWi )2
@Ci
@ri
+
(1 + ri)
2
1  lWi
@2Ci
@ri@lWi
=
(1  ij)H 00i
(1 + ri)
  (1  ij)riF
00
i
(1 + ri)
(26)
+
@ij
@lWi
H 0i  
@ij
@lWi
F 0i
At a symmetric equilibrium @Ci
@ri
= 0 and hence
@2Ci
@ri@lWi
=
(1  lW )
(1 + r)2

(1  )H 00
(1 + r)
  (1  )rF
00
(1 + r)
  
2
H 0 +

2
F 0

(27)
28
For Ci to be strictly concave function of lwi and ri the following conditions must hold
@2Ci
@ (lWi )
2 < 0
@2Ci
@ (ri)
2 < 0:
Equations (23) and (25) imply that the above inequalities hold since H 00; F 00 < 0 and
H 0; F 0 > 0:It must also be the case that
@2Ci
@ (lWi )
2
@2Ci
@ (ri)
2  

@2Ci
@ri@lWi
2
> 0: (28)
Let
Z =
r
 
lH
2
(1 + r)4
(1  )2(1  lW )2
"
@2Ci
@ (lWi )
2
@2Ci
@ (ri)
2  

@2Ci
@ri@lWi
2#
Since lW < 1 and r > 0, it is clear that (28) is satised if and only if Z > 0: From (23),
(25) and (28) it follows that
Z =
r
 
lH
2
(1  )2 
8<:

(1 )H00
(1+r)2
+ (1 )r
2F 00
(1+r)2
  H0
1+r
  rF 0
1+r

 ((1  )H 00 + (1  )F 00)
 

(1 )H00
(1+r)
  (1 )rF 00
(1+r)
  
2
H 0 + 
2
F 0
2
9=;
After re-arrangement this can be written as follows
Z = L+M  N
where
L =
r
 
lH
2
(1  )2 (1  )(1  )H
00F 00 > 0
M =
r
 
lH
2
(1  )2 ( (1  )F
00H 0   (1  )H 00F 0) > 0
N =
r
 
lH
2
(1  )2


2
H 0   
2
F 0
2
 0
The above inequalities enable us to state alternative su¢ cient conditions to ensure
that Z > 0:
29
The rst condition is derived by noting that
L =
r
 
lH
2
(1  )2 (1  )(1  )
2
 
lH
 2(n+1)
f

lF
lH
 (+1)
r
 
lH
2
(1  )2 (1  )(1  )
2
 
lH
 2(n+1)
f
(1  )
(1  )f

lF
lH
 1
= 2
 
lH
 2
M =
r
 
lH
2
(1  )2
 
lH
 (2+1) 
(1  )f

lF
lH
 (+1)
+ (1  )f

lF
lH
 !
=
r
 
lH
2
(1  )2
 
lH
 (2+1) 
(1  )f (1  )
(1  )f

lF
lH
 1
+ (1  )f (1  )
(1  )f
!
= 
 
lH
  1 
1   +
r
1  

N =
r
 
lH
2
(1  )2
1
4
 
   f

lF
lH
 !2
=
r
 
lH
2
(1  )2
1
4

   f (1  )
(1  )f
2
=
r
4


1    

1  
2
By denition,
lH =
1  lW
1 + r
Combining this with the rst order condition (11) for an internal equilibrium yields

1   +
r
1   = (1  )
 
lH
 1
Subtituting in the formulae for L and M yields
L+M = 2
 
lH
 2
+ (1  )  lH 2
= 
 
lH
 2
Hence
Z = L+M +N
= 
 
lH
 2   r
4


1    

1  
2
30
Replacing lH yields the following
Z =

(1  )2


1   +
r
1  
2
  r
4


1    

1  
2
(29)
where
r =

(1  )f
1  
1=
Dene  < 1 as follows

1   = (1  )

1  
Also dene
Y =
(1  )2



1  
 2
Z (30)
From (29) it follows that
Y = ((1  ) + r)2   r
4
(1  )2

2
= r2   2

(1  )2

2
8
  (1  )

r + (1  )2 (31)
From(30), and (31) it follows that Z > 0 if and only if
r2   2

(1  )2

2
8
  (1  )

r + (1  )2 > 0
This is the condition for Ci to be strictly concave in lWi and ri:
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Assuming that the system is originally in an interior symmetrical equilibrium, the e¤ect
of a simultaneous and equal change in fi and fj can be derived as follows
(1  )C =  lH1  +  lF 1  f
=
 
lH
1   
1 + r1 f

=

P
(1 + r)Q
1   
1 + r1 f

=

(1  )(1  )
 + r1 f
1   
1 + r1 f

(32)
31
Let
g = r1 f
=

(1  )f
1  
 1 

f
=

1  
1  
 1 

f
1

Then
dg
df
=
g
f
> 0
and
lnC = Const+ ln(1 + g)  (1  ) ln( + g)
and
dC
df
=

1
1 + g
  (1  )
 + g

dg
df
= C

   (1  )+ g
(1 + g) ( + g)

g
f
Note that dC
df
< 0 if and only if
 < (1  ) (33)
g <
(1  )  

(34)
The second of these inequalities can be written as follows
f <

(1  )  

 
1  
1  
1 
(35)
The inequalities (33) and (35) are the conditions given in Proposition 2 of the text.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Consumption in the mixed economy is given by equation (32)
(1  )C =

(1  )(1  )
 + r1 f
1   
1 + r1 f

(36)
where
r =

(1  )f
1  
1=
32
Consumption in the hunting only society can be derived by setting f = 0 in this
equation:
(1  )CH =

(1  )(1  )

1 
Hence
CH
C
=

1 +
r1 f


1
1 + r1 f
Eliminating r yields proposition 4.
6.4 Unilateral increase in agricultural productivity
To derive the e¤ect of a unilateral change in technology by one group alone, we proceed
as follows. Consumption for the two groups is given by
Ci = (1  ij)Hi + (1  ij)Fi + jiHj + jiFj (37)
Cj = (1  ji)Hj + (1  ji)Fj + ijHi + ijFi (38)
Di¤erentiating (37) and (38) yields the conditions for an internal best response by
each group
@Ci
@lWi
=
 (1  ij)H 0i
1 + ri
  ri(1  ij)F
0
i
1 + ri
(39)
 @ij
@lWi
Hi  
@ij
@lWi
Fi +
@ji
@lWi
Hj +
@ji
@lWi
Fj
= 0
@Cj
@lWj
=
 (1  ji)H 0j
1 + rj
  rj(1  ji)F
0
j
1 + rj
(40)
 @ji
@lWj
Hj  
@ji
@lWj
Fj +
@ij
@lWj
Hi +
@ij
@lWj
Fi
= 0
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The above makes use of some of the following
lHi =
1  lwi
1 + ri
; lFi =
ri(1  lwi )
1 + ri
lHj =
1  lwj
1 + rj
; lFj =
rj(1  lwj )
1 + rj
@lHi
@lWi
=
 1
1 + ri
;
@lFi
@lWi
=
 ri
1 + ri
@lHi
@ri
=
 (1  lwi )
(1 + ri)
2 ;
@lFi
@ri
=
(1  lwi )
(1 + ri)
2
@lHj
@lWj
=
 1
1 + rj
;
@lFj
@lWj
=
 rj
1 + rj
@lHj
@rj
=
 (1  lwj )
(1 + rj)
2 ;
@lFj
@ri
=
(1  lwj )
(1 + rj)
2
i
Di¤erentiating (39) with respect to fi yields
0 =

 (1  ij)
1 + ri
H 00i
@lHi
@fi
+
(1  ij)
(1 + ri)
2H
0
i
@ri
@fi
+
1
1 + ri
@ij
@l
H 0i
@l
@fi

(41)
+

 ri(1  ij)
1 + ri
F 00i
@lFi
@fi
  ri(1  ij)
(1 + ri)
@F 0i
@fi
  (1  ij)F
0
i
(1 + ri)
2
@ri
@fi
+
ri
1 + ri
@ij
@l
F 0i
@l
@fi

 @ij
@lWi
H 0i
@lHi
@fi
 

@ij
@lWi
F 0i
@lFi
@fi
+
@ij
@lWi
@Fi
@fi

+
@ji
@lWi
H 0j
@lHj
@fi
+
@ji
@lWi
F 0j
@lFj
@fi
  @
2ij
@l@lWi
@l
@fi
Hi  
@2ij
@l@lWi
@l
@fi
Fi +
@2ji
@l@lWi
@l
@fi
Hj +
@2ji
@l@lWi
@l
@fi
Fj
Let
@lWi
@fi
= xi;
@lWj
@fi
= xj
@ri
@fi
= yi;
@rj
@fi
= yj
34
Then
@lHi
@fi
=   1
1 + ri
xi   (1  l
w
i )
(1 + ri)
2yi
@lFi
@fi
=   ri
1 + ri
xi +
(1  lwi )
(1 + ri)
2yi
@lHj
@fi
=   1
1 + rj
xj  
(1  lwj )
(1 + rj)
2yj
@lFj
@fi
=   rj
1 + rj
xj +
(1  lwj )
(1 + rj)
2yj
@l
@fi
= xj   xi
@Fi
@fi
=
Fi
fi
@F 0i
@fi
=
F 0i
fi
Substituting in (41) yields
0 =
 (1  ij)
1 + ri
H 00i

  1
1 + ri
xi   (1  l
w
i )
(1 + ri)
2yi

(42)
 ri(1  ij)
1 + ri
F 00i

  ri
1 + ri
xi +
(1  lwi )
(1 + ri)
2yi

+
1
(1 + ri)
2

(1  ij)H 0i   (1  ij)F 0i

yi
+
1
1 + ri

@ij
@l
H 0i + ri
@ij
@l
F 0i

(xj   xi)
 ri(1  ij)F
0
i
(1 + ri) fi
  @ij
@lWi
Fi
fi
 @ij
@lWi
H 0i

  1
1 + ri
xi   (1  l
w
i )
(1 + ri)
2yi

 @ij
@lWi
F 0i

  ri
1 + ri
xi +
(1  lwi )
(1 + ri)
2yi

+
@ji
@lWi
H 0j
"
  1
1 + rj
xj  
(1  lwj )
(1 + rj)
2yj
#
+
@ji
@lWi
F 0j
"
  rj
1 + rj
xj +
(1  lwj )
(1 + rj)
2yj
#
  @
2ij
@l@lWi
@l
@fi
Hi  
@2ij
@l@lWi
@l
@fi
Fi +
@2ji
@l@lWi
@l
@fi
Hj +
@2ji
@l@lWi
@l
@fi
Fj
35
In symmetrical equilibrium all second di¤erentials
@2ij
@l@lWi
etc. are zero. Moreover,
@ij
@l
=

2
;
@ij
@lWj
=

2
@ij
@lWi
=  
2
;
@ij
@lWi
=  
2
@ji
@lWi
=

2
;
@ji
@lWi
=

2
Assuming symmetrical equilibrium, substituting in (42) and rearranging yields
0 =
 (1  )
1 + r
H 00

  1
1 + r
xi   (1  l
w)
(1 + r)2
yi

 r(1  )
1 + r
F 00

  r
1 + r
xi +
(1  lw)
(1 + r)2
yi

+
1
(1 + r)2
[(1  )H 0   (1  )F 0] yi
+
1
1 + r


2
H 0 + r

2
F 0

(xj   xi)
 r(1  )F
0
(1 + r) f
+

2
F
f
+

2
H 0

  1
1 + r
xi   (1  l
w)
(1 + r)2
yi

+

2
F 0

  r
1 + r
xi +
(1  lw)
(1 + r)2
yi

+

2
H 0

  1
1 + r
xj   (1  l
w)
(1 + r)2
yj

+

2
F 0

  r
1 + r
xj +
(1  lw)
(1 + r)2
yj

This can be written in the form
Axi +Byi +Dyj =
r(1  )F 0
(1 + r) f
  
2
F
f
(43)
where
A =
1
(1 + r)2

(1  )H 00 + r2(1  )F 00
  1
(1 + r)
[H 0 + rF 0]
36
B =
(1  lw)
(1 + r)3
[(1  )H 00   r(1  )F 00]
+
1
(1 + r)2
[(1  )H 0   (1  )F 0]
+
(1  lw)
(1 + r)2

 
2
H 0 +

2
F 0

D =
(1  lw)
(1 + r)2

 
2
H 0 +

2
F 0

Di¤erentiating (40) with respect to fi yields
0 =
"
 (1  ji)
1 + rj
H 00j
@lHj
@fi
+
(1  ji)
(1 + rj)
2H
@rj
@fi
+
1
1 + rj
@ji
@l
H 0j
@l
@fi
#
+
"
 rj(1  ji)
1 + rj
F 00j
@lFj
@fi
  (1  ji)
(1 + rj)
2F
0
j
@rj
@fi
+
rj
1 + rj
@ji
@l
F 0j
@l
@fi
#
 @ji
@lWj
H 0j
@lHj
@fi
  @ji
@lWj
F 0j
@lFj
@fi
+
@ij
@lWj
H 0i
@lHi
@fi
+

@ij
@lWj
F 0i
@lFi
@fi
+
@ij
@lWj
@Fi
@fi

  @l
@fi
Hj  
@2ji
@l@lWj
@l
@fi
Fj +
@2ij
@l@lWj
@l
@fi
Hi +
@2ij
@l@lWj
@l
@fi
Fi
In symmetrical equilibrium all second di¤erentials
@2ji
@l@lWj
etc. are zero. Moreover,
@ji
@l
=  
2
;
@ji
@lWj
=  
2
@ji
@lWj
=  
2
;
@ji
@lWj
=  
2
@ij
@lWj
=

2
;
@ij
@lWj
=

2
In symmetric equilibrium the second di¤erentials
@2ji
@l@lWj
etc. are zero and above equation
37
can be written after rearrangement as follows
0 =  (1  )
1 + r
H 00

  1
1 + r
xj   (1  l
w)
(1 + r)2
yj

 r(1  )
1 + r
F 00

  r
1 + r
xj +
(1  lw)
(1 + r)2
yj

+
1
(1 + r)2
[(1  )H 0   (1  )F 0] yj
1
1 + r

 
2
H 0   r
2
F 0

(xj   xi)

2
H 0

  1
1 + r
xj   (1  l
w)
(1 + r)2
yj


2
F 0

  r
1 + r
xj +
(1  lw)
(1 + r)2
yj

+

2
H 0

  1
1 + r
xi   (1  l
w)
(1 + r)2
yi

+

2
F 0

  r
1 + r
xi +
(1  lw)
(1 + r)2
yi

+

2
F
f
This can be written in the form
Axj +Dyi +Byj =  
2
F
f
(44)
where A;B and D are dened above.
In equilibrium
ri =
 
fi(1  ij) 
1  ij
 !1=
rj =
 
fj(1  ji) 
1  ji
 !1=
Thus,
 ln ri = ln fi + ln(1  ij)  ln
 
1  ij

 ln rj = ln fj + ln(1  ji)  ln
 
1  ji

and

ri
@ri
@fi
=
  1
(1  ij)
@ij
@l
+
1
(1  ij)
@ij
@l

@l
@fi
+
1
fi

rj
@rj
@fi
=
  1
(1  ji)
@ji
@l
+
1
(1  ji)
@ji
@l

@l
@fi
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In symmetric equilibrium these yield

r
yi =  

1
(1  )

2
  1
(1  )

2

(xj   xi) + 1
f
(45)

r
yj =

1
(1  )

2
  1
(1  )

2

(xj   xi) (46)
which can be written,after addition, as follows

(1  )  

(1  )

xi  


(1  )  

(1  )

xj +
2
r
yj = 0 (47)
yi + yj =
r
f
(48)
The system of linear equations (43), (44), (47) and (48) can be explicitly solved,
but the resulting formulae are very complicated. However, they can be easily solved by
standard numerical methods in particular cases.
To nd the e¤ect on consumption for group i note that
dCi
dfi
=
@Ci
@fi
+
@Ci
@lWi
@lWi
@fi
+
@Ci
@ri
@ri
@fi
+
@Ci
@lWj
@lWj
@fi
+
@Ci
@rj
@rj
@fi
For an internal equilibrium @Ci
@lWi
= 0 and @Ci
@ri
= 0: Hence
dCi
dfi
=
@Ci
@fi
+
@Ci
@lWj
@lWj
@fi
+
@Ci
@rj
drj
@fi
=
@Ci
@fi
+
@Ci
@lWj
xj +
@Ci
@rj
yj
Also, from (37)
@Ci
@fi
=
(1  ij)Fi
fi
@Ci
@lWj
=  @ij
@lWj
Hi  
@ij
@lWj
Fi
+
@ji
@lWj
Hj +
@iji
@lWj
Fj
+jiH
0
j
@lHj
@lWj
+ jiF
0
j
@lFj
@lWj
@Ci
@rj
= jiH
0
j
@lHj
@rj
+ jiF
0
j
@lFj
@rj
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At symmetric equilibrium
@Ci
@fi
=
(1  )F
f
@Ci
@lWj
=  H   F   1
1 + r
(H 0 + rF 0)
@Ci
@rj
=
1  lW
(1 + r)2
( H 0 + F 0)
Thus
dCi
dfi
=
(1  )F
f
 

 H   F   1
1 + r
(H 0 + rF 0)

xj (49)
+
1  lW
(1 + r)2
( H 0 + F 0)yj
Substituting the previously obtained values of xj and yj yields the required di¤erential.
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Figure 1. Agricultural Productivity and Consumption: 
Mixed Farming and Hunting 
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Figure 2 . Comparison of Mixed  Economy with Specialized Hunting
(Parameters as in Curve C4 of Figure 1)
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